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IT IS AN HONOR TO BE INVITED HERE TO AD-
DRESS THIS DISTINGUISHED GATHERING, AND I HAVE 
CHOSEN AS MY SUBJECT "CIVIL .AFFAIRS/MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT IN THE ATOMIC AGE". 
I 
MY OBSERVATIONS AND STUDY OF MILITARY 
OPERATIONSjlEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC 
PRINCIPLES AND THEORY OF WAR DO NOT CHANGE 
MATERIALLY, REGARDLESS OF THE AGE IN WHICH 
THEY TAKE PLACE. 
AS STATED BY CtAUZWITZ, WARFARE HAS THREE 
MAIN OBJECTIVES: 
I. TO CONQUER AND DESTROY THE ARMED 
POWER OF THE ENEMY. 
2. TO TAKE POSSESSION OF HIS MATERIAL 
AND OTHER SOURCES OF STRENGTH. 
3. TO GAIN PUBLIC OPINION. 
THESE OBJECTIVES MAY BE SUMMED UP AS 
THE MfSSION OF THE ARMY, WHICH IS/"TO DEFEAT 
THE ENEMY FORCES IN LAND COMBAT AND GAIN 
CONTROL OF THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE." 
FROM THE TIME THE FIRST WAVE OF INFANTRY 
PENETRATES ENEMY TERRITORY/rHE COMMANDER IS 
AN OCCUPIER UNDER THE TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAwJND HE IMMEDIATELY AFFECTS AND 1s 
AFFECTED BY THE CIVILIANS 1·N HIS AREA OF 
COMBAT. CAMG DEClSIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE 
MADE, NOT ONLY TO CONFORM TO THE OBLIGATIONS 
IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW, NOT ONLY TO 
INITIATE CAMG PROGRAMS THAT WILL FACILITATE 
THE ATTAINMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY 
OBJECTIVES, BUT ALSO AS AN IMMEDIATE MEANS 
OF DIRECTLY SUPPORTING AND FAtlLITATING 
HIS MILITARY OPERATIONS. 
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HIS SUCCESS IN COMBAT REQU IRFS THAT 
HE DESTRO Y THE ENEMY FORCE 
• • • AND SUCH 
FORCE INCLUDES NOT ONLY COMBAT ELEMENTS 
'UT THE RESOURCES ·,oB rLI ZED IN THE IR SUP -
PO T /As WELL Av THE PO L IT I CAL AGEN CY THAT 
Dl~E CTS SUCH FOR CE AGAINST HIM. THIS DES -
RUCTION IS ESSENT IAL TO THE PRIWARY OB -
J ECT I VE OF WINN ING A WAR .· REASON , HOWEVE~ 
DICTA TES THAT FORC E MUST BE APP LI ED WITH 
DISC ~l ~ INAT ION : THAT DEST RUCT ION ~UST BE 
MEASURED AND LIMITED TO ACTU'L RE( UIRE-
,E TS OF THE u NO T NECESSAR ILY 
MASS IVE OR TOTAL. 
THE JPP LI CAT IO N OF EVE1~ SUCH FORCE 
AS IS REQUIRED TO WIN A WAR/HAS A TREMEN -
OO US tFFECT UPON TH~ CIVIL POPULAT ION . 
AND THE AFFECTED CIVIL POPULAT ION 1 
• 
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I N TURN ' CAN HAVE A TREr~ENDOUS Er FE CT UPON 
T1E COMMANDER ' S AB I L I TY TO CONT I NUE THE 
APP LI CAT ION OF REQ UI RED FORCE . 
THE COMMANDER ' S DEC IS I ON IS INFLUENC -
ED NO T ON LY BY THE RELAT IVE COMBAT PO i' 'ER 
OF OPPOS I ~G FORCES/BUT ALSO BY THE CHARAC -
TE IST ICS OFT E AREA OF OPERAT IONS . AC-
CO Dlf GLY , HE MAKES DEC IS IONS WITH RESPECT 
TO H I S RESPONS IBI LITIES TO A POP ULAT ION/ 
BY CF EFULL Y WE IGH ff'G THE CAMG ESTIMATE 
OF THE S I TUAT I ON/I N CON J UNCT I ON WI TH THE 
EST IMATES O.F HIS STAFF MEMBERS DEAL I NG 
WITH P RSONNEL , lt'TELL IGENCE , OPERAT I ONS 
At O LOG I ST I CS . 
TH IS CAMG PLANN ING MUS T BE A CONSTANt 
CONT INU ING OPERA- ION/iN FULL COORD I NAT I ON 
WI TH THER STAFF SEC TI ONS/To DETERM INE THE 
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I I WH I CH C i1G OPERAT I ONS MA Y BEST 
UTE T THE OVER - ALL MI SS I ON , TO 
I U E THE COOR D I ~· T I ON OF CA 1viG ACT I V I T I ES 
vl TH Tn T I CAL PER ' T I ONS , AND TO INSU RE 
-- C '. PA B I L I TY OF T F E CO M rv1 M tJ DE r: ' S CAM G 
ur · AT IU 3 T COP ' 1TH THE C I V I L I AN 
P O · LE v1S C U 0 D 
• 
C 
Tl E COE OF FREE LARG ~S WITH 
hE APP NCE F \ E PONS or I NC REASED 
E0T U T I VE 1ESS , THE SCOPE OF THE COM -
' S CMG ESPON S IBILITIES BECOMES 
ESPON I GLY I t TE NS I F I ED . ,~oo::-R J 
,vi I L I T R T IONS , EVEN I F CARR IED OUT 
\ I T~ D I SC I f I T I ON , WI LL C EATE PROB LEMS 
FU P ~l_LED MAGN ITUDE. 
, i l i t a r C on c e t s o f t h e. 
COP - I TH THE E FOB LEMS ON THE 
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ATO 11 C BA TT LEF IELD OF THE F IELD ARM Y ___ _ 
F ' I· T I S H ER E TH A T TH E 8 AT TL E I S WO N 8 Y 
CO V1BA T ~~-~ LET US EXAM I NE SOME OF THE 
t,; . E p Ts , 'V H I C H \i I L L r p L y • TH r s s E AR CH 
FuR MAX I MUM COMBA T EF FECT I VENEss/ 1 S A 
cor~1 1NULNG PROCE s shNo H s A D I FE CT RE-
LAT ION TO CMG . 
EI RST, _____ in the Atomic Ag e tbe battl~-
f i e I d w i LI b e g f w u ~:b o r ea :.t er d e P t b a ad 
width tban eyec Q~fQce. 
THIS CONS IDERAT ION/P LU S THE FAC T 
THA T OUR owr MANPOWER AVAIL AB LE FOR CON -
, 
T OL OF THES E LANDS AND OP UL AT IONS THERE -
IN WI LL BE LI MITED , HIGH LI GHTS THE NE CESS I-
TY FR us TO INCREASE OUR EFFECT IVENEss/ 
T irO UGH DEVELOP ING CAMG TECHNOLO~ IC AL 
P~OF ICIENC Y TO T~E MAX l~UM. 
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IN THE POL ITIC AL SC IENCE F IELD/IT 
. . . 
CA~ BL EXPECT-0 THAT RESEARCH , VAL UABLE 
O AMG , CAN BE ACH IEVED NOT BY ONL Y 
D I SC O V i E. If G UNKNO WN P H ENO ~v1 EN A/BU T B Y D I S -
OVE ING NEW EXPLO RAT IONS OF CAUSE AN D 
CONS EC. U;: NC E , I N SUBS T I TUT I ON ro R OLDER 
VIEWS FO UN D TO BE ERRONEOUS or ~UPERST I-
TIOUS. FOR INSTA NCE , lT MAKES A GREAT 
DE AL OF DIFFE RENCE IN AN INDI VIDUA~S 
APPROACH TO A P ROBLEM/1 F HE BEL I EVES THAT 
WARS ARE CONSC IOUSL Y INTENDED HUMAN ACT IO~ 
. . 
PERPET RATED BY THE ACT IONS OF CERTA IN IN-
DIVIDUA LS OR GRO UPS, OR THAT WARS ARE i ORE 
THE CHARACTER OF EC ON OM IC DEP RESS IONS 
Tt ~ kESU LTANT F tUMAN ACT IONS ARIS ING 
QU ITE lRR ELEVANT TO THE CONSCIOUS PURPOSES 
OF THE PART ICI PANTS . 
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IM IL ARLY , WITH RES PE CT TO THE 
D V LOP MEN T F E' 1 C1MG TECHN IQUES , WE 
· EALIZE TH AT THE SYSTEMAT IC DEVELOPMENT OF 
TH ncAMG SC IENCE" I S I N ITS INFANC Y. 
CERT IN A EAS OF RESEARCH HAVE 8 EEN DEF I NBJ, 
AO I AM SUE THAT THE ARM Y I S WORKING ON 
T EM . WHAT NEW CAMG RESEARCH F IELDS REMA IN 
T BE UNCOVE ED IS NOT KNO N. HO WEVER , UN -
OuUBT~DL Y LA GE AREAS , CU RR EN TLY UNRECOGN IZ 
' ILL BE DEF INED . AS IN THE PAST , IT WILL BE 
THE ESPONS IBl LITY OF THE U. S. ARMY CAMG 
SCHOOL / To n ABSORB" THE RES UL TS OF BOTH 
- -
TO DAY' S KNO WN AND TOMORROW ' S UNKNO WN 
RESEARCH , BY CONVERT ING IT INTO CAMG DOC TRINE 
AND USIABLE TRA INING MATER IAL APPL ICABLE TO 
THE ATOM IC BATTLEF IELD . 
THE TASK AHEAD IS A CHALLENGE WHICH CAN 
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AND V I LL BE MET , FOR OUR ARMY PROPOSES TO 
AINTAIN TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY OVER OUR 
POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES, AND FURNISH OUR 
COMBAT CO~MA1 DERS WITH QUALIFI ED CAMG 
PERSONNEL FOR USE / WHEN ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF 
EXTRAORDINARY EFFICIENCY MUST BE ROUTINE IF 
wE ARE TO SURVIVE. 
&~COND, -----basic combat units, under 
a tom i c co n d i t i o n s , w i I I p ro b a b I y ta k e th e 
form of smaJ I integcatad ,battlfle. QCQY'22 of 
al I arms. They must be §emi-iadeQeaci~ot, 
se..Lf . G10-Cr1ii in~g, and capable . .a.i gg.ecat le~ 
QYer e~teoded distances / on a fluid battle-
ground for prolonged periods/with minimum 
control and support by higher headquarters. 
SUCH TACTICS WILL CALL FOR A GREATER 
MEASURE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY ON TH E PART OF 
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OUR CO MMAN DERS, THEIR STAFF~ AND THEIR MEN/ 
THAN THAT TO WHICH WE WERE ACCUSTOMED. THE 
DENANDS ON LEADERSHIP DUE TO SUCH DIS PERSAL , 
vHILE AT THE SA~E TIME EMPLOYING COMPLEX 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WILL REQU IRE FULL UTILIZA-
TION OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE CAMG ORGANI-
ZATION/To SSIST IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF 
THE MISSION. THIS MEANS THE USE OF G5 STAFFl 
SECTIONS; DEPLOYMENT OF CAMG UNITS; THE 
THOROUGH EDUCATION OF OFFICERS AND MEN IN 
TH ROLE AN B CAPABILITIES OF THE CAMG 
ORGANIZATION; AND, MAK ING PROVISION FOR 
CARRYING OUT CAMG FUNCTIONS IN THOE LOWER 
ECHELONslwHICH ARE .NOT AU THO RIZED CAMG 
ST FF SECTIONS. 
IN THIS RESPEC T, IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO 
OT THAT CURRENT CAMG DOCTRINE IS ADAPTABLE 
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TO THE EQUf EMENTS OF THE ATOM IC BATTLE -
F I E L D • I T I S N O T O L D ; I T H AS E ME R G E O S I NC E 
WW I I AND IS DER IV ED FROM THE LESSONS OF 
HIST RY. rT I S EXPRESSED IN FM 100-5, 
"OPE ' AT IO NS" ; FM 101-5 "STAFF OFFICERS FIELD 
- -
MAN UAL 11 ; FM 4 I - I 5 , n CA MG U N I TS " ; AN O FM 4 I -10 
"CAv1G OPE AT IONS". THE BASIC CHARACTERISTIC 
- -
F TH I S DO C TR II E , P ER TI I N I NG TO ORGAN I Z AT I O N1 
A E: 
-~~. a. ORGAr IZAT ION OF CAMG UNITS IS NO T 
I G I D , I T I EX T E ME LY F LEX I B LE , 8 E I N G BA SEO 
0 TOE 4 I -500R. TH IS CELLULAR TYPE TO-E / 
PROV IDES THE CAPABILITY FOR ORGANIZING UNITS 
1TH TH SE FUNCTIONAL SPECIALISTS AND CAMG 
OFFICERS/NECESSITATED BY THE REQU IR EMEN TS 
F THE AREA IN WH ICH DEPLOYED. TH ESE UNITS 
1 Y BE ADJUSTED TO AN Y S IZE BATTLE GROUP 
I I 
ft 
T VH ICH THE Y MAY BE ASS IGNED , AND MAY BE 
ADAPTED TO V' 1 TEVER TYPE TRANSPORTAT ION IS 
REQU I ED ; 
~. b. CAMG UN I TS M Y BE ASS I GNED TO 
AR f-1/ Y, CORPS AND D I V I S I ON S, I N 'VH I CH CASE 
THE Y ARE EMPLO YED TO GIVE CMG SUPPOR T TO 
THE COMMA ND TO WHICH ASS IGNED ; 
~, c. DECENTRA LI ZAT ION OF COMMAND 
AUTHO \. ITY (" OPERAT I OtA L CHA IN OF COMMAND" ) 
OVE CAMG ur n s/1s PROV I DED I N A MOB ILE OR 
UNSET TLED S I TU T I ON ; TH US THE DEMANDS OF 
DISP~RSAL CAN BE ME T; AND 
~ . d . A P INAR Y FUNCT I ON OF THE CAMG 
Pt.,AT ( ~11s r,AX I MUM UT ILI ZA TI ON OF THE 
·,ESOURCES OF T ' E AREA FOR THE SUP 0 0RT OF 
THE COMB T FORCES ; A NECESSAR Y AID TO 
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B TTLE GRO UPS OPERATING OVE R EXTEND ED AREAS 
FO R PROLONGED PER IODS. 
THIRD, ----- The staggered tactical forma-
tions of the atomic battlefield, d ispersed 
in gr eat depth, places heavy emphasis on 
reconnaissance and survei I lance to cover 
v o i d a re as • Th er e w i I I b .e an e v en gr ea t er 
need for timely and accurate intelligence/ 
in order to reduce to a m1n1mum al I un-
certainty regarding the enemy. 
THE VITAL PLACE WHICH CAMG INTELLIGENCE 
CAN PLAY/ IN KEEPING THE RESP ONSIBLE COMBAT 
CO MM 'NDER INFORME D OF TH E PO LITI CA L AND 
i CONOM IC EFFECTS ON THE POPUL ATI ON/ON 
C u~~Es OF AC TIO N OPEN TO HIM/HAS BEEN 
f cCOG~ (ZED , Ar D IT IS INCORPORATED IN 
FM l l-5 AS THE CAMG EST IMATE OF THE 
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SITUAT ION . THE RFCE~TLY PUB LISH ED 
FM 41-10, "C MG OPERATIONsn , EXPANDS THE 
CHAPTER ON CMG INT ~LL IGFNCE . IT COVERS 
T lE DEVELOPMENT OF A?PROPR IATF ESSENT IAL 
LEMENT OF I NFO RMAT I ON I N THE FUNCT I ONAL 
FIELDS; COL LECTION GENCIES , BO TH MILITARY 
AND CIVILI AN; AND , PROCEDURES FOR COL -
. LECT ION , EVA LU AT ION AND DISSEM INAT ION OF 
INTELL IGENCE . A SAMPLE CAMG INTFLL IGENCE 
COLLECT IOf PL "N IS INCLUDED THl.:.RE IN. THE 
PU ·POSE IS TO DEVELOP A SYSTEMAT IC PRO -
C D U ·, E ;; 1H I CF '-; I LL F UR r I SH THE CO MB A T CO M -
;iANlJE ' WITH T~ 'E TYPE OF INTEL LI GENCE HE 
rns/R GA DI NG THE PEOPLE I N H IS AREA . 
E ~ILL T~ ~REB Y BE \ BLE TO TAKE ACT ION TO 
PRECLUDE HE EC NOM IC, POL ITlC AL AN D 
GOVERNMEt·1TAL REACT IONS OF THE POPULAT ION/ 
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FROvl ERUPT ING INTO THREATS TO THE SECU .~ ITY 
OF HIS FORCES o · TH F ACCOMP LI SHMEN T' OF 
HIS v1 1SS ION . 
WIT H ACCENT ON DISr ERSA L, THE SUr-VE IL-
LANCE OF LI GH TLY HELD ANO UNO CCUP l tD VO ID 
AREAS/PRESEN TS EVEN GR.::.A TER INTELLIGE NCE 
AND SECUR ITY PROBLEMS THAN AtYTH ING WE 
H VE PREV IOUS LY FACED . FOR SOM~ Tl E IT 
HAS BEE r COGr IZED/Tl·i AT THE MA I N FACTO R r OR' 
EFFEC I VEL Y GA i 41 N 1 car TROL OVER GUE RR ILLA 
Fll CES IS riE R ST AT ION OF LAW AN D ORD ER/ 
COUPLED WI-HA BAS IC ECONOM IC STAB ILIT Y 
(F M 100- 5 ). FOR LI GHT LY HEL D AREAS , THE 
TA SK IS P, IWAP ILY ONE OF GENERAT ING CON-
F I DEN CE A\tlONG THE POP UL T f.QN IN THE LOCAL 
GJ VE NM NT'S AB ILITY Ar D WILL INGNESS TO 
FUR ' l oH PROTECT I ON . TH I S IS DO N~ BY 
FU RN ISHI NG THOSE GOVERNMEN T SERV ICES 
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(SUCH AS COMMUN ICj TIONS , EMPLOYMENT , REL IEF 
NE E D S AS I\J E C ES SAR Y , E TC . ) I N C LU D I N G P RO -
T CT ION , SO THAT WHEN THE GUERR ILLA STEALS 
- "E FkRM R's P IG, THE rA MER , INST~AD OF 
BE I NG I NT I MI DATED , WI LL HAVE THE COURAGE 
TO . EPORT THE INC l DEN T. 
UI\JOCC UP I ED VO I D AREAS PRESE NT A MORE 
l~F ICULT PROBLEM . TH IS CAN BE MET BY 
EX t:NS 101 OF LOC L GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCE 
INTO THESE AREAS . STU J IES RELAT I VE TO 
G E MA i i::. X P , I EN C E S I N WW I I /PO I N T U P M \ N Y 
OF THE PROBLEMS PEPT INEN T TO TH 1S S ITUA-
TION . or E OF TIE MOST LOG IC[ L SOL UTIONS/ 
13 AT OF EXTEND ING LOCAL PUBL I C SAFETY 
AGENC Y PERSONf EL AND ORGAN IZAT ION INTO 
THE VO I D ARE / T'J ACT AS A GUE F: f: I L. LA AND 
SU V nS IVE FU CE DETtRRENT . 
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Problems of the tomic attlefield Commander 
LET us row TU RN OUR ATTENT ION TO THE 
EX 1-.\4 1 'AT IO N OF S ME OF THE PROBLEMS OF AN 
E.::iSEt Tl LLY C IV ILI AN NATUF:E/"I H ICH IN-
ES C AP B LY C ON F RON T A CO Mf\/1 ;, f JD E R I N TH E CO N -
DUC T F HIS OP~RAT IONS ON THE ATOM IC 
ATTLEFIELD. 
CIVIL I /N S , lN L RGER NUMBERS PERHAPS 
THA ~ ·- vE . ENC U TE ED BEF O E , WI LL COM -
v10 LY SU FF c. R Tl · E EFFECTS ,. F WAR I N ~ .. RS ON AL 
L0 '"'.3 , I J U Y, DEPR IVAT l O~' )./'J D LACK OF THE 
BA,EST ESSENT IALS OF LIFE . THEY WI LL NOT 
HAVE THE GUI DA NCE, ASS ISTANCE OR COf·J TROL / 
~OM LLY P OV IDED BY THE FOR~ER LO G L 
LEVE LS OF GOIERNME NT. CONT INUI N~ DhMASE 
lf l L L Cu .- ~ T F~ I B U T t. TO MA S S H Y S T C' R I A /AN D TE N 0 
TO C. ·VE T T E PRC:V I OUS LY NOR MAL POP ULACE 
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INTO · N UN CONTPOLLED MOB ; A MULTITUDE OF 
SCARED , HURT ANO O I SRUPTEO PEOPLE/WHO SEEK 
UN LY T · FLEE FUR THE R f NJ UR Y W I TH WHA T EV ·- R 
POSSESS IONS AS ARE INTACT , AND OBTAIN , BY 
A Y MEAf S POSS IBLE , TH T \lH f CH IS NECESSAR Y 
TO , E iv1 A I f AL I V E • 
FRO; TH COMM Af DER 'S PO INT OF VIEW , 
·~vHAT IS HE EFFECT OF THE PROBLEMS POSED 
BY THESE CIVILI ANS ON HIS COMBAT OPERAT IONS ? 
T~ 11SWER IS NOT HARO TO I MAG I NE . THE Y 
CLUTTER TH~ ROADS/AND INTERFERE WI TH OR 
PREVENT THE ESSENT I PL MOVEMFNT OF TROOPS 
AND SUPP LI ES , ANO OFTEN ARE I J CCTED 
DI ,E CTLY INTO THE COMB AT OPE f': AT I ON . THEY 
REC Ul f:E AM ZING TONNAGES OF fA ILI TAR Y 
SUPPL IES MEREL Y TO REMA IN AL IVE , AND CAN 
COMPEL A DIV S ION OF COMBA T TROOPS TO 
P OTECT LINES OF COMMUN ICAT IONS AND SUPP LY 
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INSTALLAT IONS . THEY CAN R~ru rRE A SIM ILAR 
DIVE S ION OF TROOPS TO NEUTRAL IZE ~UERR JLLA 
ACT ION , FOMENTED BY UN DETECTED ENEMY AGENTS 
A rv10 N G TH EM • Tr E y C /~I N DO At. L TH I s AN D MOR E • 
'EY Cr ALL BUT ST P A vi JL I TAR Y OPER, T JON 
ITS T ACKS ,U NLESS PROPER ACT ION IS 
TA Al T I C I P TE A~ D P LAN I N ADV ArJ CE 
--uc1-· CAMG Cu~T OLS , AS A PA RT OF THE 
VILITA ~Y ACT ION , AS N I LL EFFECT IVEL Y 
COUNTERACT THESE OTHERW ISE PROBABLE CON -
DITIONS . 
THE COMMANDER ' S CA1\~G O ERATIONS ARE 
NOT LI ~ITED TO CIV IL CONTROL AND REL IEF . 
COORD INAT ION WITH CIC , CIVILIANS ARE 
~C~~EN D TO l ~SU ETHE DETECT ION OF ENEMY 
AGEf 1 TS//i D THt. PF EVENT ION OF S1 BOTAGE AND 
kEAR ARE t DISU RDE S. LQQAL CIY IL PEE~NSE 
A ~ D il,~ MA~ E C Q (~ I 8 Q 1. AC -; I V I T I ES A R E 
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COORO lt'4ATc.D WITH Tl 1 0SE OF U. S. FORCES . 
iv A I . A I f A CO i~ D I T I O N OF LAW AN D O R D ER A ~o NG 
I I L I A S • P U B L I Q ti ~ 8 ~ T ~ \ N D SAN L -CAT l ~ 
A E KEP~ U GER SURVE ILL ANCE TO INSURE THE 
P F\ '~ V EN T I O N OF E P I DEM I C O f SE ASE TH A T 1 ,1 I G H T 
AFFECT THE GOMBAT EFFECT I.VENESS OF OUR 
ARMED FO PC ES . l N[ORMAT I0~.~~0 1~ ARE EX -
PLOIT ED TO INF RM THE CI VIL PO ULACE OF 
THE PURPOSES AND A I MS OF UN ITED STATES 
FF O T, A D TO I MP O VE THE RE LAT I ON S BE -
TWEEt OU FO CES AN D T~E. EOPLE OF THE 
C O Ur ' T . Y ~~· I TH \JH I CH WE ARE AT WAR • B.f -
i 
SUPPO r T OF MILI TA Y [E~U IREMEN TS, AS WE LL 
S ~ l ~ I UM ESSENT IAL CI VILI AN NEEDS . • • 
ND CERTtt lNLY NOT LEAST , THE EXTENS IVE 
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CA, G CJ GAr l Z T I ON , FUNCT I ON ING CONSTANTL Y 
AT THE GR ASS ROOT S LEVE L, CONST I TUTES AN 
~[EECT IVE sopRCE QE lrlfQRMAI IQ~ ANO 
lNIEL L I Gf,~LCJ~ OF I MPORTANCE TO THE COMB .T 
EF FOR T. 
TO :UMMAR IZE , IT IS BECOM ING INCREAS -
I NG LY APPAREN T THAT , " AL THO UGH WEAP ONS 
c. H A GE • H u MJ N r A TUR E RE MA I N s THE s AM E 11 / 1 s 
A F AC,- ·~,H I CH . G \EATL Y I t~CREASES THE PROBLEM 
OF ThE FUTUhE COMBAT COMMANDER . 
rv,O DERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND H r GH LY 
TECHN ICAL MILI TAR Y FORCES/R EQ UI RE MOB ILI-
AT f ON OF THE r ULL INDUSTR IAL (NO RESO URCE 
POTENT IAL OF A NAT ION INVO LVED IN WAR ~ EVEN 
TH E TH f> AT OF T E I · U St.. AF F EC TS NO T O N LY 
vHU LE N T I UNS BUT IN TE 'N;·, T I ON, L BALANCES 
A vv E LL • UN D E R SU CH CO r D I T I ON S , TH E COM -
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AT C MMt-d 1DER MUST CONDUCT H IS OPERAT IO NS 
w I TH FU L L REC O G N I T I O N O F TH E E FF EC T UP O N 
THE POP ULATION I NVO LVED/ANO THEIR POLIT IC AL, 
l::CONOMIC AND GOVER~MENTAL ST EUCTURE S , I F 
U L T I M TE V I C TO R Y I S , I N FA C T , TO B E 
ACH li:. VED . 
SUCCESSFUL MILITARY .COMMANDERS THRO UGH -
OUT H I ST Y, SUCH AS JULIUS CAESAR AND 
A L EA Ar D E R , i E C O G N I Z E D TH E PR O 8 L E M O F CO N -
TOLLING THE POP ULACE , AND TOOK MEASURES 
APP ROPRIATE TO THE STAGE OF WEAP ONS 
DEVELOPMEN T OF THE I R TIME/ro COPE W(TH IT. 
ON THE OTHE HAND, OUT STAND I NG EXAMPLES 
F LESS FORT UNA TE MILIT AR Y LEADERS NHO 
COULD NOT OAPT/ARE FOUND I N THE EX ER I ENCES 
OF NAPOLEON I . i1 D H ITLER , IN THE IR RUSS I AN 
CtdVlPh l Gf' • 
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AS WE LOK A~EAD TO THE .ATO MIC AGE , 
Ti·' E COMBAT COMMANDER' S MISSION REMA I NS THE 
SAME . THE NEW ELEMENTS INTRODUCED , HOWEVER , 
ARF THE VAST NUMBERS OF HUMAN BE INGS AFFECT -
ED BY THE EXTENT , AND , WHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
ARE USED , THE INTENS ITY OF THE OPERAT ION . 
SUCH CONDIT IONS WILL DtMAND THE OEVELOPMANT 
Ai DUSE OF THE MOS T EFF I CIENT CAMG ORGAN l-
z A T I O N ·vv H I CH C 1\ N 8 E D E V I S E D , I N OR D E R T 0 
COPE V' ITH THE CHARACTER IST ICS l )APL ICIT IN 
ATOM IC WARFARE , WHICH INCLUDE : 
BALANCE AND FLEX IBILITY IN OUR 
ARMED FORCES . 
A CONT INUI NG NEED FOR CONVENT ION AL 
FORCES. 
NECESS ITY TO BE PPEPARED TO COPE 
WITH AGGRESS ION OF VARY ING FORMS . 
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ESSENT IALL ITY OF THE ARMY IN 
GA INING OUR POSTWAR OBJ ~CT IVES . 
f/co ~TI NU I NG SEARCH TO INSURE 
MAX IMUM COMBA T EFFECT IVENESS . 
flEXTREME MO BILITY OF SE LF - CONT AINED 
BAT TL E GRO UPS WHICH ARE DEP LOYED 
OVER WI DE AREAS IN GREA T OEP Th . 
~ INCREASED N~ED FR ACCURATE 
INTEL LI GENCE AND SURVE ILLANCF 
OVER UN OC CU P IED AREAS . 
'fl~ Fo RC ES WH I CH MUST BE AB LE TO 
CONCENTRATE RAP IDL Y, ATT ACK HARD , 
AND DISPERSE QUI CKL Y. 
'f}GREA T REL IANCE ON AIR TRANSPOR T. 
Me e t i n g t h e C AM G - ~.Ei~ • .L.C..!=r 111l ~ -t.~ 
SOME PROPOSED MEASURES FOR MEE TI NG 
Tl E CA~G REQU IREMENTS OF THE ATOA IC AGE 
ARE AS FO LL OWS : 
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I. G5 STAFF SEC TI ONS ANO CAMG 
UNITS MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE COMBAT 
COMMANDER ' S FORCE . MILI TARY P~RSONNE L 
TH RO U G HO U T THE SE f,: V I CE S MUS T 8 E l N DOC TR I N AT -
ED IN THE CAMG CAPAB ILI TIES , IN ORDER TO 
P OV IDE THE BALANCED FORCE NEEDED TO CARRY 
OUT THE CO~MANDER ' S MISS ION. 
2 . THE OPERAT IONAL NATURE OF 
CAMG MUST BE RE FLECTED THROUGHO UT MILIT AR Y 
DOCTR INE ; THE G3-G5 RELATIONSHIP MUST BE 
u·~oERS TOOD BY CO MMANDERS AND PL /l NNERS . 
3. G5(C AMG) REPRESENTAT ION 
SHO ULD BE ESTAB LI SHED ON MILIT AR Y ASS IST -
ANCE ADV ISOR Y GRO UPS/IN ORDER TO DEVELOr 
A CAPAB ILI TY WI TH I N IND IGENOUS ARM IES TO 
CONDUCT CAMG OPERAT IONS . 
4. CLOSt LIAIS O~ SHO ULD BE 
vL I NTA l ~~ED BETWEEN AGENC IES CONCERNED 
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WITH OU E LP TIO NS ,V I TH O TH C R PEO LES ,;: 
SUCH S --HE FORE I GN SERV ICE , ICA , US IA, 
U I ~ I N O R DER TO f"1l , E MA/ I MUM US E OF TE CH -
N I QUES DEVE LO PED/AND SMOO TH OUT TRANS ITI ON 
uF AUTO ITY P OB LE MS . 
5. DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPREC IAT ION 
F THE EEO OF THE F I ELD COMM/1,NDER /FOR 
CL EA -, LY DEF I E O r', T ION AL . 0 BJ t. CT I VE S AND 
POL ICIE S. 
6 . - COUR GEMENT OF THE DEVELOP -
MENT OF A VIAB LE DOCTR l~E TO COUNT ERACT 
COMMUN IST PR01 AGANDA. 
7. ,AK ING MAX IMUM USE OF THE 
F .~E INTEL LECTUAL ANO RE Ll ~ IOUS TRAD ITIO NS 
F THE U. S. IN COMB ATING COMM UNISM AND 
GA 11· I 1 G OUF POST- WAR OB JECTIVES. 
8. CRE S ING CAMG ERSONNEL 
FF I C I i.:.t CY BY: 
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a. MA INTA INING A CON TINU ING 
RtSEARCH PROGR AM IN ORDER TO DEVELOP NE W 
TtCHN IQUES , PRO CEDU RtS , TEST I NG CRITER IA 
AND DETECTION OF NE W RtSEARCH AREAS . 
b . PLAC ING EMPHAS IS DU ~ING 
(I). THE r!OLE OF CAMG I N 
COMBAT OPERAT IONS ; DEVELOPMENT OF PL ANS , 
ORDERS , AND ANNEXES; 
( 2 ). PROBLEM SO LV I NG 
METHODS ANO TECHN IQUES; 
(3). CULTURAL AND EN -
V IF,.ONMENTAL FACTO RS/AFFECT ING THE RELAT ION -
SH IP BETWEEN OUR ~ ILITARY AND LOC AL GOVERN -
MENTS AND PEOPLES; 
(4 ). PROCEDU ~ES FOR AL-
LOCATING MANPO WER AND RESOU RCES . 
9 . EMPHAS IZING CAMG OR IENTAT ION IN 
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ALL BRANCH SERV ICt SCHOO LS. 
10 . THE PROBLEM OF TRA I N I NG CAMG 
PE 1 SON EL IN AREA CHARACTER I STI CS AND 
L~~GUAGE(i l LL BE GR TLY MAGN IF IED DUR ING 
T1E ATOv1 1C AGE/BC:CAUSE OF THE WI DE AREAS 
uF G ·EAT DEPTH WH I CH RE CO 'TEMPL,.TED . 
0 M~ET TH IS PECUIREME~T, AREA DOCUMENTAT ION 
1wv I LL '·l VE TO BE KEPT CUF:R NT AND EXTREMELY 
CO i · C I SE . LSO , EVERY EFFORT WI LL HA VE TO 
BE MA DE TO DES IGNATE E 1 .R LY THE ARE AS OF 
DEPLO YMEr T IN ORDE~ THA T THE LANGU AGE 
T-·A I :~ I l~S ~ E'.U I REMEN TS MAY BE MET . 
I I. I T I S ESSENT IAL THAT CAMG PLANS , 
U i f T ~'0 STAFF SECT IONS BE INCLUDED IN 
AL L 1 !i \ E UV ER S A rtJ D C PX ' S , I N OP DE R TH A T 
0 R GA I I Z AT l ON AL At D DOC T I N AL DEV E LOP ME N TS 
,1 I TH I N THE A MY /ri/iAY PROV I OE THE COMBA T 
COM~A~DER OF THE FUTURE WI TH THE 
28 
C PAB ILITY TO HANDLE HIS CAMG RESPONS IBILI-
TIES . 
I 2 • I NC E SE D E MPH AS I S SHOULD BE 
P LACED ON CA MG f NT ELL I GEN CE TR A I N I NG , I N -
CL UDING THE EST I MATE OF THE SITUAT ION AND 
INTEL LI GE CE COL LECT ION PLAN . 
:13. THE I ND I GENO US PUBLI C SAFE TY 
ORGA~' I ZA T I ON SHO UL D BE EX TENDED THRO UGHO UT 
THE U OCCUP IED AREAS AS FAR AS PRACT ICABLE , 
T ACT AS A GUERR I LLA AND SUBVERS I VE FORCE 
OE TE El T. 
14. I NCREASED EMPHAS I S SHO UL D BE 
PLACED ON REF UGEE co~:TRO L / 1 N OR DER TO 
PfEVENT INTERFERENCE 1TH GRO UND MOBILITY. 
IN ONCL U~ION,THE CR fT~ CA L PO INT OF ATOM IC 
\A F RE \ I LL HINGE ON THE COMBA T COMMAND R'S 
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. ILITY TO EXPLO IT THE ADVANTAGE GA INED 
F RCHvt T,1 E USE OF THE WEAPON . WI TH THE 
CH;..QT I C COND I T I 01·s EN VI S IONED , HIS AB ILITY 
T HANDLE THE ~ULTITU DINO US PROB LEMS --
. . " 
TECHN IC1 L, IDEOLOG ICA L, LOG I ST I CA L -POSED 
. . . 
BY THE POP UL AT ION AMONG WHOM HE rs OPERA T-
1 G, MAY WEL L SPEL L THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
HI SUCCESS OR FA ( LURE . IT IS FOR TH rs 
" . 
TASK/THA T CAMG I S ORGAN IZED . IT IS A 
P O F O UN D CO MM N D RESP ON S I B I L I TY • I T 
. . 
BEHOOVES AL L OF us/To DEVE LO P A BE TT ER 
U DERSTAND ING WITH IN OUR MILITAR Y ESTAB -
Ll HMEN T OF CAMG ACT IVITIES , AND TO fMP LE-
i~E T THE BJ CT IVES IN WAR AND IN PEACE . 
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